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CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION
Currency in circulation increased approximately $3.56 billion in
the two-year period 1940-41. During the subsequent two and a half
years to June 30,1944,die increase amounted to $11.3 billion. At
that date the great proportion of this currency consisted of Federal
Reserve notes of which almost $18.9 billion were outstanding.
These notes amounted to more than 50 percent of total Reserve
Bank liabilities, and exceeded member bank reserves by over $6
billion.
In the main the increase of currency in circulation can be
accounted for by the rise in wage payments and in living costs, espe-
cially in food and clothing.49 Additional requirements for currency
expansion have resulted from shifts in population accompanied by
the severance of banking connections and from changes in the char-
acter of retail buying. Accumulations of currency abroad arising
from expenditures of soldiers have also been a factor. Currency
in circulation since 1942 has grown more rapidly even than wage
payments, which comprise about 70 percent of national income pay-
merits. This difference is partly attributable to factors such as the
growth of activities conducted on a cash basis for purposes of con-
cealment and tax evasion. Also, it reflects a greater use of cash as a
medium of saving, particularly by individuals in the lower and mid-
dle income groups, who do not maintain checking or savings ac-
Counts with banks.5°
At the time of our entry into the war Federal Reserve gold hold-
ings were so large that they imposed no restraint on currency expan-
sion. Owing chiefly to the extraordinarily rapid and Continuous
expansion of currency in circulation, combined reserve ratios against
Federal Reserve Bank deposits and note liabilities had declined
by the end of June 1944 to 56 percent from 74 percent at the end
of June 1943, and 86 percent at the end of June 1939. This rapid
rate of decline in reserve ratios would, if continued many more
49C.R. Whittlesey, The Effect of War onCurrencyand Deposits (National Bureau
of EconomicResearch,Financial Research Program, Occasional Paper 11, 1943) pp.
24-28.
60 See theNational City BankLetter(February 1944)p.23, andG. L. Bach, "Cm--
rency in Circulation," Federal Reserve Bulletin (April 1944) pp. 318-28.
45months, necessitate resort to one or more of the expedients outlined
earlier to satisfy currency demands.5'
Whatever form the increase of currency in circulation may take
under present conditions it will be based largely on .government
debt, without regard to the amount of gold held by the government
or formally pledged as security against irredeemable Federal Re-
serve note issues.Consequently United States notes(so-called
greenbacks) or other Treasury issues that might be substituted for
Federal Reserve notes are not uniquely inflationary forms of cur-
rency merely because they represent monetization of the public debt.
The question at issue is not whether to meet the demand for more
currency but how to meet it, when or if the Federal Reserve Banks'
reserves against notes approach the statutory minimum. That
would involve decisions of policy by the Federal Reserve and
Treasury officials that should be influenced to some extent by the
reaction to be expected from the public. Employment of the emer-
gency devices authorized by the Thomas amendment would pos-
sibly meet with an unfavorable reception, in part because issuance
by the government of unsecured paper money, like direct borrowing
from central banks, is associated with loose fiscal practices.
Suspension or reduction of statutory reserve requirements against
Federal Reserve notes would be the most direct method of meeting
the increased currency demand, if that demand should continue
until emergency action has to be taken. It not only would obviate
resort to devices for increasing the currency supply that have fallen
into disrepute, but it would concentrate responsibility for meeting
currency demands in the hands of the Federal Reserve authorities.
The wartime growth in the use of currency has been interpreted
to reflect a long-run shift in the money-using habits of the country,
with currency becoming more and more the money of individuals,
and demand deposits the money of business.52 Even if such a shift
is actually occurring, a return to normal living conditions after
hostilities may bring some reduction in the volume of currency in
circulation. Lowered employment and payroll declines in the post-
war period would reduce cash holdings of wage earners. Hoarded
cash might also be spent to satisfy pent-up demands for durable
consumer goods.
51 See above, p.3.
52 Bach, op cit., p.328.
46An inflow of currency into the banks as a result of such develop-
ments would increase the volume of bank reserves equally with bank
deposits, and thus add to the volume of excess reserves. If such an
inflow were to occur at a time when the Federal Reserve authorities
were trying to curl) an undesired inflationary expansion of credit
their task would be rendered all the more difficult. To the extent
that member banks had previously borrowed from the Federal
Reserve Banks, the return of currency might be offset to some degree
by repayment of such indebtedness. But in view of the limited
volume of member bank borrowing to date, such offsets are not
likely to be important. On the other hand the return of currency
to the banks, coinciding with a drop in employment, might be wel-
comed as a stimulus to credit expansion.
CHART 3— PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN MEMBER BANK DEPOSITS BY FEI.ERAr,
RESERVE DISTRICTS, JUNE 30, 1939_JUNE 30, 1944a
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The wartime expansion in member bank deposits by Federal Re-
serve districts, June 30, 1939—June 30, 1944, is shown in Chart 3.
Even gTeater diversity of deposit increase than that among the dis-
tricts has occurred among reserve cities; for example, deposits
of member banks in Portland, Oregon were up 324 percent and
those of Pueblo, Colorado only 5 percent. For the commercial bank-
ing system as a whole, increases in deposits have been balanced by
increases in holdings of government securities. The location of
deposits, however, is subject to continuous shift, depending upon
the income-spending patterns of depositors whom the banks serve.
Under our unit banking system, banks meet deposit transfers
by drawing on their reserve funds. If these funds are not adequate,
it is necessary to convert earning assets into reserves. But, a transfer
of deposits between banks does not necessarily result in the transfer
of the specific earning assets held against them, since the asset pref-
erence of banks gaining deposits may differ from that of banks losing
deposits. Thus values in two different credit markets may be
affected by deposit transfers. If banks losing funds liquidate earn-
ing assets to offset the drain, and banks gaining funds prefer to hold
such funds in the form of excess reserves, then a net addition to the
reserves of the banking system is needed to avoid disturbing the
deposit and asset position of other banks.
The Federal Reserve Banks as the ultimate source of additional
reserve funds in wartime are closely concerned with both intra- and
inter-district (net) flows of funds; their concern is enhanced by the
war and the responsibility Federal Reserve officials have assumed
for the orderliness and stability of the government bond market.
The type of problem to which inter-district flows of funds give rise
may be illustrated by the developments in the New York District
during 1942-43, referred to earlier. The funds obtained by the
Treasury from the sale of government securities to the New York
banks and from tax collections in the. New York District were
largely disbursed for war production in other districts. To meet
the resulting deposit drains, New York banks found it necessary to
employ their excess reserves and to sell securities. The Federal
Reserve Banks constituted the primary demand for these security
offerings. They either added to the total supply of reserve funds
through open market purchases or served as intermediaries through
48which these securities were transferred to outlying banks gaining
deposits. Similar adjustments will undoubtedly be required of the
System during and after the war. They may present especially seri-
ous problems after the war when a considerable and abrupt reduc-
tion and relocation of productive activities may well be accom-
panied by heavy intr4- and inter-district shifts in deposits.53
The four surveys of deposit ownership conducted by the Board
of Governors bear upon these problems.54 At the end of July 1944
deposits of incorporated and unincorporated businesses were esti-
mated at $37.4 billion or nearly 63 percent of the estimated $59.6
billion of demand deposits belonging to individuals, partnerships
and corporations, while deposits belonging to individuals estimated
at $18.6 billion comprised M percent of the total. The remaining
6 percent belonged to nonprofit organizations, trust funds of banks
and foreigners. For the entire period covered by the surveys (De-
cember 31, 1941-July 31, 1944) the estimated total increase in de-
posits amounted to $22 billion. More than half that increase was
added to business deposits which rose 50 percent. About two-fifths
of the total increase was accounted for by the rise in individual
deposits which showed a growth of 86 percent. These surveys throw
light upon the possible volatility of existing deposits and the char-
acter of the control problems resulting from deposit growth.
At the middle of 1944 total adjusted deposits of all member and
nonmember banks amounted to $115 billion and demand deposits
of individuals, business and government to $80 billion.These
figures indicate increases of $60 and $52 billion respectively since
mid-1939 and suggest the dimensions of the credit control questions
that will confront the Federal Reserve authorities in the postwar
period.
The increase in the volume of bank deposits and currency from
the beginning of 1942 to June 1944 accompanied an expansion of
the outstanding federal debt, direct and guaranteed, of about $137
billion. Somewhat more than half of this increase in debt was
acquired by private investors and government agencies, and the
remainder by the commercial banks and the Federal Reserve Banks.
By adding newly acquired nonbank security holdings to the increase
53 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Reporl, 29.
54 Federal Reserve Bulletins (August 1943)p.713,(October 1943)p. 918, (May
1944)p.432 and (November 1944) pp. 1069-76.
49in deposits and currency, the total increase in liquid assets of busi-
ness concerns and individuals for the two and a half year period is
shown to approximate $1 10 billion.Fromthe preceding data it
is evident that at the conclusion of the war the public will hold an
immense volume of liquid resources in the form of demand deposits
and currency, savings deposits, savings, bonds redeemable in cash
on demand and other readily salable government obligations.55
The effect on problems of postwar credit control of savings bond
redemptions, of liquidation of government securities holdings by
nonfinancial corporations, and of repayment of maturing debt will
depend not only upon their volume but upon the methods employed
by the Treasury to finance these demands, and upon the then cur-
rent state of business.If the Treasury should borrow from the
commercial banks to obtain funds for paying off savings bond
holders and meeting maturities when business is expanding and
prices are rising, a most accentuation of inflationary
pressure might result. If redemptions and maturities were financed
by bank borrowing when business was declining and deflationary
pressures were in evidence, such financing might be looked upon as
a compensating influence.
PUBLIC DEBT IN THE BANKS
The preceding discussion has emphasized the tremendous volume
of public debt lodged in the commercial banks and the Federal
Reserve Banks by war financing. At the end of June 1944 member
bank holdings of government securities amounted to 72 percent of
their total loans and investments as compared with only 42 percent
in June 1939. Government securities were nine times bank capital
accounts in June 1944 as compared with two and a half times
55 Federal Reserve Bulletin (April 1944) p. 330.In a statement before the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee,March24,1944 onS. 1764 to amend the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942,MarrinerS.Eccies, Chairman of the Board of Gov-
ernors,said: "Theinflationary potential whichitis estimated will exist at the end
ofthis fiscalyear,onJune 30,1944, measuredby demand deposits and currency, sav-
ings depositsinthe banksand Government securitiesheldby businessconcernsand
individually,but cxc] uclingGovernmentsecuritiesheld bylifeinsurance companies
andbanks,will amount to194 billiondollars;113 billions heldby individuals and
81 billionsbybusiness. This compareswithliquid holdings as of June 30, 1941,of
48 billionsheldby individuals and SI billions held by business, a totalof79 billions.
in other words, there willhavel)een an increase inthethree-yearperiodof 115 hi!-
liondollars."
50accounts in June 1939. Except for a small volume of industrial
assets, and discounts and advances, all the earning assets of the Fed-
era! Reserve Banks at the close of the fiscal year 1944 consisted of
government securities. These figures reflect drastic changes from
1939.
As stated earlier the Treasury has endeavored to confine commer-
cial bank purchases of government securities during the war emer-
gency largel.y to maturities not exceeding ten years, and in general
this aim has been attained. The proportion of bank portfolios ma-
turing in less than one year increased from 4 to 31 percent from
mid-1939 to mid-1944, andshare maturing in less than 5years
from 36 to 57 percent. These changes, shown in Table 2 for each
major group of banks, have been encouraged by Federal Reserve
Bank policies designed to broaden the market for short-term issues
and to stabilize the pattern of interest rates. Open market purchases
of the Federal Reserve Banks have been concentrated in this section
of the market, and Reserve Banks have stood ready to take over corn-
TABLE 2 —DIsTRIBuTioNOF GOVERNMENT SECURITY PORTFOLIOS
OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS AND MEMBER BANKS,
MATURITY, JUNE 1939 AND 1944
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51mercial bank offerings of Treasury bills in unlimited amounts at
fixed or relatively fixed prices.56
However, bank holdings of the longer maturity classes have ex-
panded as well. Holdings by member banks of maturities in excess
of 5 years amounted to $25 billion or 3.7 times capital at the end
of June 1944 as opposed to $7billionor 1.3 times capital accounts
In 1939. This expansion in the bank market for intermediate and
longer-term issues has heightened the interest of commercial banks
and the Federal Reserve authorities in the stability of the market
values of these securities.
Referring to the possible effects of postwar inflation on the struc-
ture of interest rates and the market values of government securities
in general, the Board of Governors asserted that "in view of the
enormous growth of our public debt, it will be vitally important to
keep direct controls in effect after the war is ended, and thus to
hold the line on economic stability."57
With commercial bank deposits and currency based preponder-
antly upon government debt and expanding with the increase in
that debt, the supply of money is evidently no longer adjustable
to any significant extent to changes in the volume of business trails-
actions. Deposits and currency are not deflatable, under such cir-
cumstances, except by the retirement of bank-held federal debt or
by transfers of government obligations from commercial banks to
nonbank investors. Currency in circulation may return to the banks
but the resultant reduction in this form of cash holdings would be
offset by an increase in deposits. Contrariwise deposits may con-
tract with an outflow of cash from commercial banks; that, however,
would only change the form and not reduce the volume of money
in the possession of the public. The inelasticity of currency and
deposit holdings built up during the war period re-enforces the
56 Board oGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1943, p. 18:
"The buying rate on bills establishedby the Reserve System, combined with the
option to repurchase at the same rate, works in the direction of giving banks greater
flexibility in the management of their reserve funds.Also, the maintenance of the
broad level of prices of other Government securities provides a high degree of liquidity.
Under these policies and with the large volume of short-term securities held by banks,
excess reserves no longer have the special significance for bank liquidity that has been
attached to them in recent years. In general, however, most banks continue to carry
some excess reserves and there appear to be a few which have the clear policy of not
allowing their excess reserves to fall below certain fixed levels."
57 Ibid.,p.10.
52conclusion that after the war monetary control instrumentalities
will be subject to severe limitations.
During World War I commercial. banks helped to finance the
war chiefly through advances to business and by means of collateral
loans to individuals enabling them to pay for their purchases of
government securities. For example; by the middle of 1919 com-
mercial bank loans and discounts constituted 70 percent of total
earning assets, while only 12 percent of bank assets consisted of gov-
ernment securities purchased in the open market.58 As loans were
paid off in 1920-21, deposit liabilities were reduced, reserves were
released in consequence and to some extent currency was paid into
the banks and retired. Thus contraction of deposits and currency
occurred automatically, and at the same time banks were supplied
with additional reserves to support a subsequent expansion of credit.
Until budgetary deficits are reduced sufficiently to permit the
government to obtain all borrowed funds from nonbank sources,
commercial bank holdings of government securities will probably
continue to increase. Furthermore in the postwar period the recon-
version needs of business and the desire on the part of consumers
to obtain durable goods and re-establish living standards may shift
outstanding securities into the banks. Given a high degree of em-
ployment that stimulated spending, such a shift would add to the
monetary pressure upon the price structure.
THE PATTERN OF INTEREST RATES
The pattern of interest rates that has obtained during the war—
rising with maturity frompercent on 3-month Treasury bills to
21/2 percent on long-term bonds—is in general the same as the one
which existed before war began. Its stability has been the result of
the action taken by the Federal Reserve Banks through open market
operations and adjustments to member bank reserve requirements,
and by the Treasury in adapting its new offerings to investor needs.
Daniel W. Bell, Under Secretary of the Treasury, in an address
on "Financing of War and the Post-War Readjustments" in Decem-
ber 1943 referred to the stability of the interest rate structure on
government securities which existed despite the tremendous increase
in offerings by the Treasury, and stated that confidence in its con-
tinuation has been and is widespread, and well justified.This
68 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1919, p.112.stability, he affirmed, had resulted in broadened subscription to the
offerings in the successive war loan campaigns by eliminating any
prospective gains that might arise from withholding funds in antici-
pation of higher rates. In addition, Mr. Bell expressed the belief
that public opinion in both the United States and Great Britain
had been revolutionized as to fair rates of interest on government
war borrowing, that the revolution in public opinion was soundly
based on underlying economic realities, and that this attitude would
be applicable to the coming peace
In an address prior to the Sixth Loan Drive, Secretary of the
Treasury, Henry Morgenthau underscored Mr. Bell's observations,
projected them into the'future, stating: "Personally, I do not antici-
pate a rise in interest rates in the foreseeable future. Savings are
abundant and promise to be adequate to meet all likely needs.
59 The problem has also been dealt with by fiscal or central banking officials of other
United Nations. In his budget speech before the House of Commons on April 12,
1943, the late Sir Kingsley Wood stated: "During this war we have stabilized the gen-
eral complex of interest rates at a level so low as would have been thought impos-
sible by anyone who merely based himself on the experience of the last war. We
have developed a new technique in these matters, and we have revolutionised public
opinion as to what are fair rates for Government war borrowing. Thus, not merely
shall we pass from war to peace with rates on a low level, but the country is,I am
sure, also expecting that reconstruction and development after the war shall have the
benefit of cheap money.Itis the Government's intention to maintain its present
policy of cheap money after the war as well as in the interests of the Exchequer
itself."
In his Annual Report to the Minister of Finance for 1943, Governor G. F. Towers
of the Bank of Canada stated: "At a meeting of the Board of Directors on February
7th, 1944, it was decided to reduce the Bank Rate to 1% per cent, effective February
8th, from the 21/2 per cent level which had been maintained since the Bank's estab-
lishment in 1933.
"The change to a 1% per cent rate does not mean that the Bank expects its credit
facilities to be needed on a much greater scale in the future than in the past. Nor
does it mean that under existing war conditions there is any less need for people to
save. The utmost effort to maintain and increase our saving is still necessary, and
the first and foremost concern of financial policy must be with winning the war. The
stage has now come, however, when many are also having to give thought to the
economic problems which will arise after the war.
"One factor which will affect decisions is the prospective cost of borrowing. It there-
fore seems appropriate that the Bank should, by reducing its Rate, signify its inten-
tion to continue the kind of monetary policy which has brought about the current
level of interest rates. A policy aimed at higher interest rates would only become
intelligible if, after war shortages are over, consumers' expenditure and capital de-
velopment were to proceed at a rate which would overstrain our productive capacity.
I see no prospect of such a situation arising in a form which would call for a policy
of raising interest rates."
54J List as I see no reason for substantially higher interest rates in the
postwar period, I do not see any need for a wholesale postwar fund-
ing of the public debt into long-term bonds....Certainlythe day is
past when the United States Government need ask its citizens or its
business enterprises to insure it against changes in the rate of
interest."60
Certain critics of the financing program maintain, however, that
the low rates of interest obtainable on short-term and medium-term
government obligations encourage the lodgment of an unnecessarily
large proportion of federal debt in commercial banks. They further
assert that there is need for a type of short-term obligation that
would attract more funds from business concerns with cash reserves.
As evidence of the lack of suitable investnient outlets of this kind
they call attention to the extraordinarily large volume of cash
reserves held by small and medium-sized businesses.
Demands are also heard for higher rates of interest on long-term
issues as a means of attracting a larger volume of individual cash
holdings. The Treasury is, however, of the opinion that a decidedly
sharp rise in interest rates, in view of the tax structure, would be
required to bring about a material expansion of security sales to
nonbank investors.It relies on patriotic appeals to provide the
prime stimulus to investment at current low rates. Moreover, what-
ever opinion one may hold about the deterrent effect of low interest
rates on investment buying, it has clearly become impractical at a
late stage of the war to raise interest rates on longer-term issues,
thereby bringing about a fall in the market value of outstanding
negotiable bonds. However, increases in short-term rates might be
feasible, with long-term rates remaining stable. The Federal Re-
serve Board of Governors stated in 1943 that "short rates, after a
sharp rise from the low point reached in 1940, are still low compared
with past periods and could advance further in response to market
conditions without affecting the rate on long-term money." The
Board of Governors added, "Prospects are that conditions in the
postwar period will favor the continuance of low long-term rates."61
A rise in short-term rates in relation to long-term rates would have
the advantage of reducing profits from price appreciation of long-
term issues and hence discourage "riding the interest curve." Corn-
60 Address in Los Angeles, October 14, 1944.
61Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1943.
55mercial banks, would be encouraged to expand their holdings of
higher-yield short-term issues, and to dispose of longer-term issues.
The rise in short-term rates, however, would doubtless necessitate
purchases of these longer-term issues by the Federal Reserve Banks
as a means of supporting the market and preventing an advance in
long-term yields.
The pressures to maintain the existing pattern of interest rates
on government securities will remain heavy during the war. They
will also undoubtedly be gTeat after the war. At that time, the
Treasury will have a large refunding task and many investors, re-
membering the losses suffered by some bondholders following
World War I, will want the market stability to continue in order to
protect the market value of their holdings. Concurrently the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks may have a problem of using their powers to
help check postwar inflation if nonbank investment in government
securities is not adequate.
The wartime pattern of interest rates is by no means typical from
an historical standpoint. While a pattern characterized by higher
rates on long-term securities has prevailed for the past 14 years, data
on yields of the highest-grade corporate bonds as of the end of the
first quarter for each of the past 45 years show that such a pattern
has prevailed in only 15 years altogether; in 19 years, short-term
rates were higher than long, and in 11 years rates were identical in
both sectors of the market. The year-to-year movement of short-term
rates on high-grade corporate issues corresponded closely with that
of money rates over this entire period, and was much wider than
that for long-term interest rates.
One of the disadvantages of stabilizing a pattern of interest rates
in which short-term rates are lower than long-term rates for an
extended period, is the incentive such stability gives commercial
banks to lengthen the maturities of government security holdings,
and thereby to benefit from the higher yields on longer maturities.
Such a tendency obviously runs counter to the declared objective of
Treasury war finance of restricting bank investment in government
securities to short maturities. The apparent intent is to keep the
market value of bank holdings of governments as stable as possible
should the stabilization policy be modified or abandoned. Provided
banks are amply supplied with short-term issues to meet current
demands for cash, declines in the market values of long-term issues
56would not affect them materially, unless they tried to liquidate
longer term holdings in the open market instead of holding them
to maturity, or were compelled to revalue them at current market
prices.
POSTWAR RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF GENERAL
CREDIT CONTROL INSTRUMENTS
The extension of a stabilized pattern of interest rates indefinitely
into the postwar period would admittedly limit the freedom of
action of the Federal Reserve authorities in the use of their general
credit control instruments. Assuming that postwar conditions call
for application of restrictive Federal Reserve credit policies, the
question arises of the effect of selling government securities in the
open market, raising reserve requirements, or advancing discount
rates.
It seems possible that member banks may have a small margin
of excess reserves at the close of the war, which open market sales
by the Federal Reserve Banks might absorb without disturbing the
existing pattern of interest rates. By allowing issues to run off and
selling a limited volume of securities from time to time to banks
with surplus funds to invest, contractions of credit might be encour-
aged without inflicting hardships upon individual banks. Con-
tinued purchases by nonbank investors, however, would be essential
to stabilization.If the Reserve Banks have to act on a large scale
to accomplish the objectives of credit policy, it is possible that the
interest structure may be subject to strain and that market values
of long-term marketable bonds may depreciate somewhat. This
would result if the short-term rates were raised and remained above
long-term rates for an extended period.In these circumstances,
investors would be encouraged to favor short maturities as against
long-term issues, thus tending to increase long-term interest rates.
Pressure on long-term interest rates would also be increased if a
strong demand for long-term capital should develop.
Raising member bank reserve requirements substantially would
likewise put pressure upon the pattern of interest rates in the
government securities market, since some member banks might be
forced to liquidate security holdings.
The third restrictive weapon—an advance of the discount rate—
would have little immediate effect by itself in bringing about a
57contraction of bank credit unless member banks were heavily
indebted at the time.It might, however, discourage excessive bor-
rowing if member banks needed to obtain supplementary reserves
in this way, and help to enforce other policies. The effect of changes
in discount rates upon investor attitudes, moreover, might be im-
mediate and sharp, and perhaps produce tensions serious enough to
disturb the pattern of interest rates.
The employment of any one or a combination of these customary
indirect methods of restricting bank credit would probably have
unsettling effects upon the government securities market, at least
temporarily. This disturbance would occur not because of the par-
ticular method or methods applied but because of the importance
of government obligations in the asset structure of the economy,
especially of commercial banks.
Instead of having to use restrictive credit policies the Federal
Reserve Banks might be faced with conditions requiring the applica-
tion of credit stimuli. In such circumstances the question arises
it would be possible for the Federal Reserve Banks to bring
about an expansion of bank credit without disturbing the interest
structure on government obligations. Here again, the stability of
the market would largely depend upon the supply of securities avail-
able for bank purchase, either from new Treasury issues or from
sales of holdings by nonbank investors.
The efforts of the Federal Reserve officials to use the customary
indirect methods of control, it seems clear, may conflict with a
policy of maintaining a fixed pattern and level of interest rates.
If the attempt to stabilize the interest structure were abandoned
voluntarily or if conditions made it impossible to continue to peg
interest rates, the officials of the Federal Reserve System might, in
accordance with past practices, attempt to bring about an orderly
transition to a higher or a lower rate level.
Should any of these instruments be used to effect a large con-
traction of credit, banks that had followed official advice to invest
in government securities to the limit of their resources might find
it expedient to adjust their portfolio positions. Any general con..
traction of bank credit ensuing from this action might reduce the
earnings of many commercial banks and might bring about some
capital losses. Under the circumstances, the Federal Reserve officials
would have to anticipate these eventualities in formulating their
58credit policies.
The fact that a rise in the interest level(i.e., the level of both
short- and long-term rates) would subject some bank assets to book
depreciation does not absolutely preclude resort to restrictive
credit policies if the national interest.would thus be served. It is
easy to exaggerate the adverse effect upon the banking system of an
increase in interest rates. A depreciation in market values of gov-
ernment securities would have most significance for issues having
maturities of five years and over. Bank capital accounts provide
a partial cushion against depreciation of these holdings if write-offs
to market values should prove advisable, or if losses should be
realized as a result of sales. As indicated earlier, moreover, pro-
cedures of bank examination authorized since 1938 have allowed
balance sheet valuation at book or cost, less amortization, which-
ever is lower. Such a method of valuation protects the appraised
value of bank assets against fluctuations in market prices and allows
time for recovery of market depreciation as bonds approach matur-
ity. For purposes of advances to member banks secured by govern-
ment securities, where eventual repayment is assured, the Federal
Reserve Banks may, of course, continue to appraise securities offered
as collateral at par.
SELECTIVE CONTROL METHODS
The obstacles to effective credit control by the general methods
discussed raise the question of the applicability in the postwar
period of selective credit control methods similar to those employed
during the war to restrict certain types of credit operations and
encourage other types.62
Credit control policies have of necessity both a selective and an
over-all quantitative content. During the formative period of the
Federal Reserve System, the emphasis of Federal Reserve credit
policies was on the eligibility features of bank paper offered for
rediscount, and hence was essentially selective in character. As the
62Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1913, p. 10:
stability depends on a complex of forces and policies, of which credit
policy is only one. In order to be effective in bringing about stability the regulation
of the availability and cost of money must be integrated with a flexible fiscal policy
and at critical times reinforced by direct controls over prices, wages, and supplies.
Further experience with selective credit controls may also bring fruitful
results."
59System developed, increasing emphasis was placed on the over-all
quantitative aspects of Federal Reserve credit however made avail-
able. In the early thirties attention reverted to the influence of
Federal Reserve policies on bank credit in selected uses. In 1933
the Federal Reserve Banks were given the power to make advances
to individuals, partnerships and corporations on their promissory
notes secured by direct obligations of the United States Govern-
ment. In 1934, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors was given
authority to regulate margin requirements "for the purpose of
preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying
of securities." Also in 1934, the Federal Reserve Banks were author-
ized to make direct advances for working capital needs to established
commercial enterprises if accommodation could not be obtained
from other sources. The war emergency has extended the Board
of Governors' contact with the public by its regulation of consumer
credit through Regulation W, and through its part in the adminis-
tration of guaranteed war credits under Regulations V, VT and T.
Margin Requirements
Regulations governing credit extensions to finance security trans-
actions have not been changed since November 1, 1937, when mar-
gins on security purchases were fixed at 40 percent and on short
sales at 50 percent under the Board's Regulations T and U. A rising
terkdency in stock prices in 1942 and 1943, prompted the Board of
Governors to consider the desirability of raising margin require-
ments. While no action appeared warranted by conditions prevail-
ing, the Board took cognizance of the possibility that "... arun-
away stock market might contribute to inflationary sentiment in the
country as a whole."63
The efficacy of increasing margin requirements on security trans-
actions in the postwar period would clearly depend upon the con-
ditiôns prevailing. Should rising stock prices develop as a result
of cash transactiOns, the effects of such action would be restricted.
It may be pointed Out that in another field of investment—farm real
estate—wartime values have been rising despite a steady decline in
owners' debt.64 Under conditions of abundant cash and liquid
63 Ibid., p. 23.
64 U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, The Agricul-
tural Situation (April 1944) pp. 12-17.
60resources, rising prices are not necessarily associated with rising debt
incurred to finance transactions. On the other hand, if a stock
market boom were accentuated by margin trading, action by the
Federal Reserve authorities would doubtless help to dampen,
though perhaps not suppress, speculative enthusiasm.
Consumer Credit Regulation as a Postwar Selective Control
It has been argued that controls similar to Regulation W should
be retained at least during the postwar transition period. The basis
of this contention is that the great volume of liquid claims which
consumers have accumulated constitute a serious inflationary threat
and that sudden postwar abandonment of the restrictions might
lead to excessive advances in the prices of goods generally sold to
consumers on credit terms.
During wartime, administrative enforcement of Regulation W
has been aided by the rise in consumer incomes and by the decline
in the supply of consumer durable and semi-durable goods. With
the return to peacetime conditions the practical or administrative
difficulties of a consumer credit regulation similar to Regulation W
would admittedly be great. However, simplifications in regulative
procedures might facilitate its execution. It must also be anticipated
that political opposition to an extension of consumer credit regu-
lation into the postwar period may arise. Such opposition may
develop because of alleged discrimination against those who do not
hold any large amounts of liquid claims, or because of the allegedly
adverse effects such regulation might have on output and employ-
ment in durable goods industries.
Even though consumer credit control as developed in wartime
might be of only limited efficacy in the immediate postwar period,
legislative authority for permanent consumer credit control may
be sought in order to provide the Federal Reserve System with an
instrument that could be used to restrain consumer spending in
boom periods and to stimulate it in periods of depression. Whether
a relaxation of restrictions imposed during a period of business
expansion would be effective as a stimulus in time of recession is
problematical, for this type of credit control operates as a brake and
not as an accelerator. However, by lengthening the average debt
period and by reducing the average down payment percentage on
instalment purchases, "potential demand in lower-income levels may
61conceivably be tapped for the consumption of durable goods."
Also, if average terms of sale with respect to down payment percent-
ages and contract length on such purchases are liberalized, there will
be an increase in outstanding instalment credit even if sales do not
rise.65 A relaxation of instalment credit terms that had been re-
stricted on the upswing wourd thus tend toward increased consumer
purchasing power at a time when it was especially needed.
Loan Guarantees and Direct Lending
Devices of the Regulation V and VT type designed to influence the
use of credit in business channels will be extended into the imme-
diate postwar period in modified form in the shape of T loans. Since
government guarantees on T loans cease when contract settlements
have been made, demands are heard increasingly for indefinite
extension of loan guarantees as an aid to financing during the recon-
version period and thereafter. Concerns unable for various reasons
to obtain needed working capital may, nevertheless, be considered
worthy of financial aid as a matter of industrial policy. A permanent
system of guaranteeing commercial banks and other financing agen-
cies against losses on loans of this kind may be evolved, with the
Federal Reserve Banks acting as guarantors or as fiscal agents for
guarantors—public or private.
The trend in this direction is evidenced by the introduction into
the Senate and the I-louse of companion bills (Wagner and Spence)
to amend section 1 3b of the Federal Reserve Act by empowering
the Federal Reserve Banks to guarantee financing institutions
against loss of principal or interest on any loan made to a business
enterprise and authorizing the Reserve Banks to make commit-
ments to purchase from a financing institution any loan made to a
business enterprise.66 The procedure underthe Wagner and Spence
bills would be similar to that followed in financing V loans, but the
Federal Reserve Banks would act as principals in this instance, not
as fiscal agents. Losses on guarantees would be met from a fund of
$139 million placed under the control of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors. That sum equals the amount subscribed to
65 See tottfried Haberler, Consumer instalment Credit and Economic Ftuctuations
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1942) p. 172.
66 These bills would in fact repeal the existing section 13b of the Federal Reserve
Act, thereby eliminating direct lending and substituting therefor the system of loan
guarantees.
62the stock of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation by the
Federal Reserve Banks in 1933. The Treasury was authorized in
1934 to make payments up to that amount to the Federal Reserve
Banks to enable them to extend direct loans to business and indus-
try. About $27 million has accordingly been paid over to the Banks.
Under the proposed measure, that sum would be transferred to the
guaranty fund held by the Board of Governors along with about
$1 12 million turned over to it by the Treasury.67
Further evidence of the increasing importance attached to loan
guarantees is provided by inclusion in the surplus property dis-
posal act of a provision authorizing the Smaller War Plants Cor-
poration to make or guarantee loans to small business enterprises
in connection with the acquisition, conversion and operation of
plants and facilities. At present the SWPC is engaged in financing
small enterprises, basing advances upon the need for expanding pro-
duction and ignoring some customary elements in credit rating. The
SWPC's repurchase bank loan plan is a method of guaranteeing
banks against loss on loans of $25,000 or less. The SWPC merely
authorizes these loans; they are made and serviced by banks desig-
nated by the borrowers. The lending banks hold the collateral and
receive interest on the loan, of which one quarter is paid to the
Corporation in return for an agreement to repurchase the loan or
the remaining unpaid balance in full on 15 days' notice.
Still another possibility would be some revision of the Federal
Reserve industrial loan program under section 1 3b of the Federal
Reserve Act which permits the Reserve Banks to make working
capital loans up to five years maturity, when such loans are other-
wise unavailable, or to participate in or underwrite such loans
when made by member banks or by other financing agencies. Even
though the amount of Federal Reserve industrial loans outstanding
at any one time is limited under this section, the Reserve Banks
still have a considerable unused margin of latitude for engaging
in direct lending to business. With slight modification of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act this margin could be widened.68
67 See text o( Senate bill 1918 introduced by Senator Wagner May 15, 1944 and re-
ferred to the Committee on Banking and Currency. Also for fuller explanation of the
composition of the guaranty fund see, testimony of Marriner S. Eccies before the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, August 24, 1944.
68 See "Industrial Loans of the' Federal Reserve Bank of New York," Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Monthly Review (July 1944).
63The unmistakable trend toward assumption of risks by the gov-
ernment through the guaranteeing and underwriting of loans made
by private banks raises some controversial issues. Advocates of the
policy maintain that an extension of the system of government loan
guarantees need not threaten the existence of the private banking
system. On the contrary, they argue that by assisting individual
banks to perform services for the community that they would not
dare undertake without government support, the private banking
system is actually protected against government encroachment. It
may, for instance, be considered desirable as a matter of national
policy to make credit advances to 'borrowers who are not acceptable
credit risks judged by customary banking standards.69In the
absence of any provision for government guarantees of private
loans, direct government lending would most likely be relied upon
to provide the desired financial assistance. When testifying before
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in favor of the Wag-
ner-Spence loan guarantee bill, Chairman Eccies stressed the argu-
ment that the proposal would provide a means of getting away
from direct lending by government agencies and put the private
banks in a position to compete with this type of government activity.
On the other hand objectors point out that willingness to take
risks provides the chief peacetime justification for the profits of
private enterprise. To the extent that banks and other private
financial institutions are guaranteed against peacetime loss on their
investments, they cease to function as risk-takers.70Safeguards
against unsound private lending may also be weakened by guar-
antees against, and underwriting of, the risk of loss on assets. Fur-
thermore, if government agencies did not limit their guarantees to
loans that they believed could be used profitably and would be
repaid according to the terms of the contract, they would need to
69 If guaranteed loans are to be used as a means of influencing the use of credit in
the postwar period, the guaranteeing Federal Reserve Banks must be administratively
equipped to exercise judgment as to the amount and the purpose of such loans and
be ready to increase guarantees at certain times, when especially needed, and reduce
them at other times. Guarantees extended more or less automatically up to a Fixed
amount would not serve as control instrumentalities.
70Atits annual convention, September 15, 1943, the American Bankers Association
passed a resolution opposing government loans or loan guarantees in the postwar
period. These loans were held to be unnecessary and "contrary to sound financial
policy and the best interests of the American economy."
64follow some general social plan for encouraging industrial ex-
pansion.7'
FOREIGN FUNDS CONTROL
The problems that have been created for the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem by the demands of wartime financing are primarily domestic
but may not be exclusively so after the war. At the present time the
Treasury holds the dominant position in the determination of inter-
national financial policies because of its control over foreign funds,
exchange stabilization operations, and transactions in gold and
silver. Quite logically, therefore, it. has taken the lead in formu-
lating plans for postwar exchange stabilization agreements, although
Federal Reserve Bank officials have been upon for advice
and have actively participated in discussion of the merits of the pro-
posed International Bank for Reconstruction and Development;
of the Treasury (White), and British (Keynes) plans, and of the
compromise stabilization and foreign investment plans approved
by delegates to the Bretton Woods Conference. The criticism of
the White and Keynes plans, and the Bretton Woods compromise,
has made it evident that they would operate, under certain condi-
tions, to inflate the money supply of creditor countries, of which the
United States would be one. The inflationary potentialities of any
plan modeled after them are noted merely to suggest their impor-
tance for postwar problems of domestic credit control that are the
concern of the Federal Reserve System.72
The Federal Reserve authorities face a postwar problem in con-
nection with blocked foreign balances and gold holdings earmarked
for foreign account. For example in case of a postwar boom the
release of blocked foreign balances and earmarked gold for expendi-
ture in this country would add to the inflationary pressure on prices
by increasing deposit currency available for spending and by adding
71 For a discussion of the implications of government insurance of bank assets for
free enterprise and the private banking system, see Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, Annual Report, 1942.
'72SeeFriedrich A. Lutz, "International Monetary Mechanisms, The Keynes and
White Proposals," Essays in International Finance, No. I(Princeton University Press,
July 1943); John H. Williams, "Currency Stabilization: The Keynes and White Plans,"
Foreign Affairs(July 1943); Jacob Viner, "Two Plans for International Monetary
Stabilization," Yale Review (Autumn 1943); J. H. Riddle, British and American Plans
for International Currency Stabilization (National Buieau of Economic Research,
Financial Research Program, Occasional Paper 16, December 1943).
65to bank reserves. Moreover, if funds were used to buy scarce goods
for export, the resuitwould be to aggravate domestic goods short-
ages and make the problem of price control all the more difficult.73
On the other hand, if the release of blocked foreign balances and
earmarked gold for domestic expenditure were to occur during a
period of demobilization unemployment and business depression,
new export demands for the surplus products of overexpanded war
industries might follow with beneficial effect.In these circum-
stances, earmarked gold released by the Federal Reserve Banks
would increase member bank reserves, and ease credit conditions
without unwanted inflationary effects.
The terms of the peace settlement, the policies likely to be fol-
lowed by the United States in assisting in the restoration of world
trade and reviving foreign investment activity, cannot accurately
be foreseen. The disposition of our vast monetary gold resources
and the fate of gold as an international medium of exchange like-
wise present problems of great importance, the solution of which
will have to be sought through international agreements.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM IN REVIEW
During the three decades of its life the Federal Reserve System has
had to adapt itself to an economy which has undergone rapid
changes and wide fluctuations. Consequently, its operations have
been exposed to and tempered by a diversity of economic pressures.
War broke out in Europe in 1914 before the Federal Reserve Banks
had been set up, and less than three years later the United States
was drawn into the conflict.During the decade following the
Armistice the country experienced two major speculative crises that
resulted partly from methods followed in financing the war. The
ten years preceding our entry into World War II witnessed an
uninterrupted succession of budgetary deficits that brought about
a huge expansion of federal security holdings of commercial banks.
In one respect, at least, our participation in World War II has
simplified the credit control problems of the Federal Reserve
authorities: it has enabled them to state their immediate objective
in specific terms. As noted in the introduction to this discussion
73SumnerH. Slichter, 'Toreign Trade and Postwar Stability," Foreign Affairs (July
1943).
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